@ver 1.0 Jul. 1, 2009 @Kiska Petals footnote

Attack Analysis of Jul. 15, 1942 / MATSUSHIMA's Letter and HORITA's report
Sonar image off KISKA by Williamson & Associates, result of Aug. 2006 expedition.
Matsushima's Figure

(Matsushima's note) Both our three vessels were torpedo attacked at this Figure's position. Only my ship could escaped.
Horita's Figure

#25 and #26 positions are different from Matsushima's letter.
The letter by MINORU MATSUSHIMA(SC #26 commander) and the report by KOYA HORITA(13th Subchaser Squadron Cheif Medical Officer) are the only witness that mentions about detail of Grunion's last but one attack. MATSUSHIMA stated two SCs(#25,#27) were destroyed by one attack and his SC(#26) barely avoided three torpedoes toward him. Grunion seems that had shot from the SC's right stern with full six torpedoes of its forward torpedo tubes. At least five ran straight, two hitted different targets and exploded, three missed #26(at most left). #27 seemed got another shot(from stern tube?). This scene is so different from the Kano Maru's. We see the Grunion on the bottom with its all(four) aft torpedo tubes door closed. Grunion seems that had no torpedoes in the aft torpedo room when it sank.

Grunion was ambushing at the mouth of the harbor, very near to the shore, outside of the submarine sweep area by the 13th Squadron. Possibly the Grunion had observed Haruyama(commander of the Squadron)'s sweep pattern for several days and decided the attack plan.
Interestingly Grunion was at the point where USS Growler(SS-215, Lt. Comdr. Howard W. Gilmore in command) had torpedoed DD ARARE on July 5th. Growler returned Perl harbor at Jul. 17th. The two submarines possibly had exchanged the information each other on the ocean.


MINORU MATSUSHIMA
SC #26 Commander's letter
KOYA HORITA
13th Subchaser Squadron Cheif Medical Officer Report Sept. 20, 1990
Note
Overview
Kiska
front
I also remenber the days when I practiced toghther with deceased Mr. Shinoda at SAEKI to KURE, then we departed to war front vigorously. I [Overview Kiska front]
(1) The enemy began attack on Kiska after our Midway Operation
(2) The First Air raid was Jun. 12, 1942. I remember.
(note) Five Consolidated B-24 came and attacked.
Height about 2000m. One plane shot down.
Two damaged.
(3) After the first raid, they did bombing continuously. Seldom at night.
(4) Day by day, the enemy submarine's activity increased.

Now, I will answer your question. Mr. Kobayashi who doesn't know the front, issued at 'HEION(peace)' is very careless and regretfully, he is only a commentator. I will report the scene one by one.

Jun. 12, 1942 Destroyer HIBIKI was damaged by air raid.

Jun. 19, 1942 NISSAN MARU sank by air raid.

Jul. 05, 1942 Destroyer ARARE and NENOHI sank by submarine attack. KASUMI and SHIRANUI badly damaged.

Sea
state
( No mention ) II [Weather and situation of that day]
(1)Date Jul. 15th 1942 about 11:33 AM(Local time)
(2)Weather Cloud. Low cloud height. No mist.
(2)Sea state 2 to 3
Good visibility, calm sea state.
Before
departure
That day when your husband was KIA, we were going to do anti-submarine sweep because enemy submarines appeared in front of the harbor. It was Mr. Sugino's turn on the duty so his vessel had already departed.
That morning my ship and Shinoda's were tided side by side untill 7:30 AM, and we had talked that let us have a rest at HOKKAIDO hot spring on our return trip to homeland.
III [Report of that day]
At that day(Jul, 15th 1942) Three subchasers #25, 26 and 27 had got together at Kiska harbor to discuss the anti-submarine sweep. This morning I moved from commander boat #25 to #26,
13th Subchaser Squadron
#25: Sugino/Haruyama's boat
#26: Matsushima/Horita's boat
#27: Shinoda's boat
Usually the Medical Officer of the squadron might on the flag boat. While operation he might on the member boat.(?)
anti-
submarine
sweep
At 8:00 AM we had departed and the three vessels joined toghether. and finished preparation, started sweep operation, moved out of Kiska harbor.
We had planned to back to the harbor at noon 12:00.
I was on the bridge from the beginnning serving concurrently as a lookout. The operation was almost over. We started back to the mouth of Kiska Harbor.
Bridge: where the commander steer the ship

I don't know how they did 'anti submarine activity'. Perhaps cruising the area and dropped depth charge for threat.

1:

1st shot
- The squadron
attacked
After we had continued anti-submarine sweep, we made transverse formation and entered toward the final course [perhaps to the harbor] just when ...
(Note;: Haruyama seemed he had planned the operation and log/course previously. They were on final straight course.)
We broke up the battle station, only lookouts left. That was 11:00AM. Just near the Kiska Is.

IV [Following is the situation]
We were at the mouth of Kiska harbor. I was in the officer's room to have lunch. Relaxed on a chair, reading a magazine(KODAN CLUB).

Officer's room might be below bridge deck, small room. (When men at battle station, they ate at the station.)
Deck(open space) means the first floor. From Officer's room to the bridge, Horita was at portside on the deck. He seemed not to see opposite(starboard) side.

1: - 2:

SC #25
(Sugino
/Haruyama) SC #27
(Shinoda)
torpedoed
(1st
shot)
just when Sugino's [#25, middle position] was enveloped by horrible water column. After the water column disappeared, also the Sugino's no more can be seen.

I could think nothing but astonished, at the same time I saw Shinoda's [#27, most right] was enveloped by yellow smoke,
also three torpedoes came toward my ship closely.

(1) 11:33AM I heard suddenly a big thud noise 'BANG'. I ran to the bridge in haste. I felt uneasy and looked port side from the deck.
(note) I thought it was air bombing, but it was uncertain at all whether strand, collision nor accident inside the boat.@
Matsushima saw water column first when Sugino's sank. He didn't see the hull.
Maybe Horita saw the hull(Sugino's) while Matsushima looked out another direction(torpedo toward him?).
Horita's figure of SC25(Sugino's) has no propeller and rudder. So it might be the bow of SC25. In the sonar image of 2006 expedition, SC25 seems lost the half of its hull.

2: - 3:

Matsushima
escaped
and
passed
by
SC25
(Sugino)
(2) I looked #25 about half of its whole lenght above the surface. Instantly it went beneath the water. I didn't certain it was bow or stern.

(note) The distance from my #26 was about 500m. I saw no explosion nor fire and smoke.
While this scene, Horita seemed that he had moved from officer's room to the bridge. Horita didn't see Shinoda's enveloped by the smoke.

Matsushima did not mention whether he watched the torpedoes toward Sugino's/Shinoda's or not.

I suppose the first torpedoes to SC25/SC27 were magnetic exploder and exploded under the hull. Second torpedo to SC27 were collision exploder. Therefore the explosions are different.

I had escaped [three torpedoes] with full speed and watched Shinoda's ...
(Note: turn to the right? Japanese subchaser was designed to be able to make quick turn. So Matsushima might turn large angle maneuver.

(3) I looked starboard(right), at about 500m distance there were #27. The ship blew up a shimmer from the stack. Also I thought #27 were whole swaying
(4) #26 turned to right immediately, to see the matter we approached to #27.
'shimmer from the stack.':
The engine of SC was diesel, so possibly the Shinoda's lost its screw and the engine was racing.

'whole swaying':
The boat was swaying by the first torpedo explosion under the hull?

3:

2nd shot
- SC27
(Shinoda's)
was
torpedoed
again
and watched Shinoda's. I saw the fire by explosion enveloped his ship again from bow direction. Suddenly we saw scarlet curtain in front of our eyes as if a carpet spreaded out. It was momentary, instantly deminished and also nothing on the surface. We continued to approach, looked at the surface, saw pure black soot on the surface widely spreading. Except the soot nothing was floating.
(5) We #26, wondering waht the cause of #25 and #27's sinking, turned to the left to the entrance of Kiska harbor.
(note) It was not runaway but merely to confirm the situation.
Sugino's was enveloped by water column. On the contrary Shinoda's disappeared by the explosion with fire. Matsushima wrote Shinoda's had not set fire, so the explosion was not of magazine nor depth charges on the deck. Probably direct hit of torpedo.

4:


3rd shot
- SC26
Matsushima
was
torpedoed
again
After I had escaped from the torpedoes, I turned to both ships sunk position ...
(Note: This torpedo seemed not the same shot to Shinoda's secondary, probably 3rd shot. This torpedo didn't explode under Matsushima's hull. Ran safely beneath, beached on the shore. US navy at that days used two type exploder, magnetic and collision. Both had serious problem. Also depth control mechanism didn't work well. They needed full of two years to solve these problems. )

(6) We found torpedoes. From portside stern at 30°
By that we recognized for the first time that we had been torpedoed by enemy submarine. I saw the torpedo wake from the bridge. Our boat immediately turned to the right, but a machinery sub-officer? at the bridge(I forget his name. he had beautiful mustache.) hurried to change the course to full left. The torpedo disappeared under the stern and left harmlessly out of sight. I had been prepared for the torpedo hit, sit down and closed my eyes for the while. Then the torpedo passed under the stern, stranded on the beach of Kiska Is. .
(note) Diameter of the torpedo was 53cm.
The good instant determination of a machinery sub-officer helped the ship from disaster.
Matsushima was an auxiliary officer (merchant school graduate) . Therefore the proper crew(military man) steered the boat when was urgent.
Later of that day I turned to both ships sunk position to rescue the survivors. But I saw only a little oil, no wood chips nor dead body. The search until the sunset was vain. Next day was the same.
(7) At this time we recognized for the first time that the cause of #25 and #27 was torpedo attack by the enemy submarine. Immediately turned back and began sweeping activity. But we had hesitated depth charging because it was just after the sinking of #25 and #27.
My
comment
and
conclusion

Our vessel was small craft with full of gunpowder and gun bullet, so the torpedo hit lit instant fire and sunk with all hands immediately.

V [My comment and conclusion]
(1)At the entrance of harbor and strait we must do threat depth charging.
(note)
1. I had usually asserted my opinion that we must do threat depth charging.
2. If we did threat depth charging near the mouth of harbor we could avoid such disaster perfectly. It was quite a miss of operation. I think we were quite as the proverb, 'Saving one cent cause lost of all money.'
3. Entrance of TOKYO Bay, Malacca strait, Bashi Channel, several straits at Philippines, my assertion is proved. The loss at mid Atlantic was quite few.

(2) When our boat #26 was torpedoed then we knew the cause of the disaster. Before that we didn't know at all why #25 and #27 was sunk. Therefore we couldn't did depth charging, also someone claims we ran away from the enemy, it is quite irresponsible comment that knowing nothing about the scene.

Above is my report remembering my memory.

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