Horita Koya Sept. 20, 1990

(note) Five Consolidated B-24 came and attacked.
Height about 2000m. One plane shot down.
Two damaged.
(3) After the first raid, they did bombing continuously. Seldom at night.
(4) Day by day, enemy submarine's activity increased.

Now, I will answer your question. Mr. Kobayashi who doesn't know the front, issued at 'HEION(peace)' is very careless and regretfully, he is only a commentator. I will report the scene one by one. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　

II [Weather and situation of that day]
(1)Date Jul. 15th 1942 about 11:33 AM(Local time)
(2)Weather Cloud. Low cloud height. No mist.
(2)Sea state 2 to 3

III [Report of that day]
At that day(Jul, 15th 1942) Three subchasers #25, 26 and 27 had got together at Kiska harbor to discuss the anti-submarine sweep. This morning I moved from commander boat #25 to #26, and finished preparation, started sweep operation, moved out of Kiska harbor. We had planned to back to the harbor at noon 12:00. I was on the bridge from the beginnning serving concurrently as a lookout. The operation was almost over. We started back to the mouth of Kiska Harbor. We broke up the battle station, only lookouts left. That was 11:00AM. Just near the Kiska Is.

IV [Following is the situation]
We were at the mouth of Kiska harbor. I was in the officer's room to have lunch. Relaxed on a chair, reading a magazine(KODAN CLUB).
(1) 11:33AM I heard suddely a big thud noise 'BANG'. I ran to the bridge in haste. I felt uneasy and looked port side from the deck.
(note) I thought it was air bombing, but it was uncertain at all whether strand, collision nor accident inside the boat.
(2) I looked #25 about half of its whole lenght above the surface. Instantly it went beneath the water. I didn't certain it was bow or stern.

(note) The distance from my #26 was about 500m. I saw no explosion nor fire and smoke.
(3) I looked starboard(right), at about 500m distance there were #27. The ship blew up a shimmer from the stack. Also I thought #27 were whole swaying
(4) #26 turned to right immediately, to see the matter we approached to #27. Suddenly we saw scarlet curtain in front of our eyes as if a carpet spreaded out. It was momentary, instantly deminished and also nothing on the surface. We continued to approach, looked at the surface, saw pure black soot on the surface widely spreading. Except the soot nothing was floating.
(5) We #26, wondering waht the cause of #25 and #27's sinking, turned to the left to the entrance of Kiska harbor.
(note) It was not runaway but merely to confirm the situation.
(6) We found torpedoes. From portside stern at 30°。 By that we recognized for the first time that we had been torpedoed by enemy submarine. I saw the torpedo wake from the bridge. Our boat immediately turned to the right, but a machinery sub-officer? at the bridge(I forget his name. he had beautiful mustache.) hurried to change the course to full left. The torpedo disappeared under the stern and left harmlessly out of sight. I had been prepared for the torpedo hit, sit down and closed my eyes for the while. Then the torpedo passed under the stern, stranded on the beach of Kiska Is. .
(note) Diameter of the torpedo was 53cm.
The good instant determination of a machinery sub-officer helped the ship from disaster.
(7) At this time we recognized for the first time that the cause of #25 and #27 was torpedo attack by the enemy submarine. Immediately turned back and began sweeping activity. But we had hesitated depth charging because it was just after the sinking of #25 and #27.
V [My comment and conclusion]
(1)At the entrance of harbor and strait we must do threat depth charging.
(note)
1. I had usually asserted my opinion that we must do threat depth charging.
2. If we did threat depth charging near the mouth of harbor we could avoid such disaster perfectly. It was quite a miss of operation. I think we were quite as the proverb, 'Saving one cent cause lost of all money.'
3. Entrance of TOKYO Bay, Malacca strait, Bashi Channel, several straits at Philippines, my assertion is proved. The loss at mid Atlantic was quite few.

(2) When our boat #26 was torpedoed then we knew the cause of the disaster. Before that we didn't know at all why #25 and #27 was sunk. Therefore we couldn't did depth charging, also someone claims we ran away from the enemy, it is quite irresponsible comment that knowing nothing about the scene.

Above is my report remembering my memory.