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051
Japan's nationalism is a sign of weakness
by Joseph Nye
The writer is a professor at Harvard and author of The Future of Power.
From 1977-1979, Nye was Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance.
from Financial Times November 27, 2012

　On December 16 Japan will hold an election and if the polls are correct,
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda will be replaced by Shinzo Abe, the opposition leader
and former PM.

　If so, he would become Japan's seventh prime minister in the past six years.

　Japanese public opinion is shifting to the right and in a more nationalistic direction.
Not only has Mr Abe recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial second world war
memorial, but politicians to his right have formed new parties and staked out nationalistic
positions.

　Shintaro Ishihara, the former Tokyo mayor who helped spur the dispute with China
over the Senkaku Islands, speaks of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.

　As once did Toru Hasihmoto, the 43 year-old mayor of Osaka and founder of
the"restoration association" party.

　All this has caused alarm in Beijing. I recently met leaders there as part of a delegation
of four former US officials charged with explaining the American position on the Senkaku
Islands.

　I was struck by the way Chinese officials expressed concern about the rise of Japan's
rightwing militarism. They charged that its government's purchase of the islands
from a private owner was designed to undercut the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
that were part of the post-second world war settlement.

　One should be wary of such alarmism...
The End

052
Japan needs to adopt
Farsighted Economic Policy
by Shumpei Takemori,
Proessor of Economics at Keio University
from THE DAILY YOMIURI Nov.27, 2012

　Japan's politics will make a fresh start following
the dissolution of the House of Representatives
for a general election.

　Liberal Democratic Party President Shinzo Abe strongly
advocates economy-buoying policy initiatives, including
one with which he would prevail upon the Bank of Japan
to eliminate deflation. It is important for the central bank
to clarify that　its policy objective is stemming deflation.
This alone cannot guarantee that our economy will experience
a healthy growth rate in the future, but Abe's concern
about the health of our economy even in the short run is
understandable, considering that the sustainability of
the　party that emerges triumphant from the Dec. 16
election will hinge on the state of the economy afterward.

　Should the new administration's popularity head south,
the ruling party would suffer in the next House of Councillors
election in August 2013 and the Diet again would be stuck
in a stalemate. Furthermore, if the economy is in bad shape
particularly during the April-June quarter of 2013,
the planned consumption tax hike from 5 percent to 8 percent
in April 2014　−ａhead of the second-phase rise to 10 percent
in October 2015　−ｍay have to be put on hold due to conditions
attached to the relevant legislation.

　During the July-September quarter of this year, the Japanese
economy slipped into negative territory. External factors were
mainly to blame for the quarter-on-quarter gross domestic
product contraction. As for the future of the economy, we will
need to keep a close eye on certain international developments,
particularly in the United States and Europe.

' Fiscal cliff ' in U.S.

　The U.S. economy will shrink by about \50 trillion if
the Democratic administration of President Barack Obama and
the Republican Party -which retains control of the House of
Representatives following the Nov. 6 vote fail to agree
on two budget-related issues within the year. In the event of
disagreement, the expiration of the George W. Bush-era tax cuts
and the mandatory spending cuts agreed on in 2011 as part of
the federal debt ceiling accord will become effective Jan. 1.
If the United States plunges off the so-called fiscal cliff,
the U.S. and world economies will suffer a serious blow.

　The stumbling block dividing the Republican and Democratic
parties is ideological. After winning the 2008 presidential
election held against the backdrop of an economic crisis,
Obama implemented a sweeping health care overhaul requiring
all Americans to have health insurance. The so-called
Obama care was not popular with many Americans who have
a tendency to spurn government interference.

　Republicans who scored overwhelming victories in the 2010
midterm elections have a tendency to be the most vocal opponents
to tax hikes - a natural consequence given that they were elected
by taking advantage of voters' opposition to Obama's initiative.

　The president has proposed that the expiration of the tax cuts
be extended for all but the wealthiest Americans. It is unknown
yet whether the Republican Party will compromise with the White
House. Even if the two parties fail to strike any deal in time,
effectively raising taxes, Obama or the Republicans will end up
facing the U.S. public's discontent, making a compromise on one
side or the other inevitable. Although the world economy will
suffer a setback initially, optimism will increase when
the United States regains political stability after it becomes
known which side will prevail, Obama or the Republican Party.
However, we cannot expect stability to return to Europe for a while.

No early stability in Europe

　In the eurozone, the prevailing misconception world-wide is
that "euro crisis" is synonymous with the "fiscal crisis"
as the problem surfaced in 2010 with Greece's fiscal woes.
However, the fiscal situations truly reached the crisis stage
only in Greece.

　The real cause of the crisis has been capital flight,
a problem which is particularly difficult to stop
from developing into a fatal stage given the ideological
commitment of the European Union - the removal of national
borders for capital transactions.

　In fact, Europe had worked to eliminate restrictions
on cross-border capital flows for many years before
eventually introducing the common currency, making investment
from Germany to Spain, for example, free even from foreign
exchange risks.

　As a result, there was a precrisis surge in Spain-bound
money from Germany with an eye on higher returns on investment.
Indeed, the snowballing capital influx from Germany continued
to fuel Spain's housing bubble. Once the housing bubble
burst and investor confidence was shattered in the Greek crisis,
a massive flight of capital from such so-called problem countries
as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy occurred.

　This had a serious adverse effect on banks in the problem
countries, the funding sources of which have evaporated overnight.
When governments' own financial conditions deteriorated because
of the costs of bailing out these troubled banks, countries found
themselves in dire fiscal straits with yields on sovereign bonds
rising. This situation convinced investors that the governments
of these countries have lost the capability of rescuing troubled
banks, aggravating the funding difficulties of the banks.

　The simultaneous progression of banking and fiscal problems
therefore is the essence of the euro crisis. No fundamental
solution to the crisis is possible as long as the investors'
perceive additional risks in the investments in the problem
countries over the investments in Germany. To eliminate
the risk differentials, the eurozone as a whole will have to
come up with a unified framework. A coherent banking union has
already been floated for joint banking supervision and rescue
in parallel with a proposal for joint issuance of sovereign
bonds guaranteed by all eurozone members. However,
as Germany opposes both plans because it would have to bear
the largest burden in either scheme, it remains uncertain
whether such a union will see the light of day in the near future.

Crisis far from over

　Currently, sovereign bond yields of the problem countries are
stable and the euro crisis seemingly remains in a state of
relative calm thanks to the European Central Bank's announcement
in September of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
program. The OMT scheme is a mechanism which can be employed
when a eurozone country formally asks an official European
institution, such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
for financial assistance and the request is accepted.
It ensures unlimited purchases of the sovereign bonds of
the country in question if bond yields show abnormal uptrends.

　The ECB has announced such a bold program speculating that
the financial markets would believe an outright bankruptcy of
a problem country will never materialize because the ECB,
with unlimited financial resources, would come to the rescue
in the event of extraordinary upward pressure on sovereign bond
yields. In fact, the markets seem to be buying the idea for the moment.

　However, there are two reasons why it is too premature to pronounce
that the euro crisis is over.

　Firstly, though the OMT program can be mobilized in coping with
a panic-driven rise in the sovereign bond yields of a problem country,
it cannot be used when the rise in the bond yields reflects the fact
that the country fiscal situation is in total disarray. In this context,
it should be noted that unlike other problem countries, Greece has
a sovereign solvency crisis par excellence. A recent economic outlook
released by the Greek parliament includes a much worse projection
- Greece's sovereign debt will balloon to the equivalent of 190 percent
of its GDP in 2013.

　Judging from past experiences, the International Monetary Fund,
which has been involved in the bailout of Greece, correctly judges
that a Greek sovereign debt default will be imminent with the current
unsustainable trajectory of fiscal outlooks. Therefore the IMF has
requested eurozone member governments and the ECB to write down loans
to Greece. But the European governments and the ECB refuse to comply
with this request because they are reluctant to have eurozone taxpayers
bear the burden of bailing out Greece. Nonetheless, write-downs on loans
to Greece will happen sooner or later, a situation that will herald
an end to the myth that the euro crisis has been resolved for good.

　The second reason is that the deep crisis in the sense of rapidly
deteriorating outlooks for employment, growth and budget deficit
- is still developing, resulting from the ongoing belt-tightening
measures taken by member states. Unprecedented austerity is under way
throughout the eurozone for problem countries and problem-free ones
alike to avert the flight of capital. The resulting compression of
demands is gathering momentum throughout the eurozone, making
the recession both prolonged and deep.

　Of late, Spain's fiscal situation, in particular, has worsened
far beyond projections. What is more, OMT assistance is unlikely
to be disbursed anytime soon, as Spain has so far avoided asking
ESM for aid because it does not want an outside intervention
into its budgetary process. The Spanish government plans
to tighten the screws of austerity further, but if such a step
increases unemployment on one hand and fails to improve the state
coffers significantly on the other, the country will keep
staggering politically and deepen the euro crisis.

　The state of the Japanese economy next spring will depend
on European and U.S. economic conditions. The upshot is that
the next Japanese government cannot alone control the country's
short-run economic situation. Therefore, the new Japanese
administration should not focus on the short-term economic
situation alone but, instead, put greater importance on long-term
policy initiatives, something it can control, with due
consideration given to economic growth and fiscal adjustments
coping with the aging of the population.
The End

053
Could China and Japan
really go to War over these ?
sadly,YES
from Ｔｈｅ　Ｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｓｔ　Ｓｅｐｔ．２２ＮＤ−２８ＴＨ，２０１２　Ｐａｇｅ１１−１２

The bickering over islands is a serious threat
to the region's peace and prosperity

　The countries of Asia do not exactly see the world in a grain of sand,
but they have identified grave threats to the national interest in the
tiny out-crops and shoals scattered off their coasts. The summer has
seen a succession of maritime　disputes involving China, Japan, South
Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.

　This week there were more anti-Japanese riots in cities across
China because of a dispute over a group of uninhabited islands known
to the Japanese as the Senkakus and to the Chinese as the Diaoyus.
Toyota and Honda closed down their factories.

　Amid heated rhetoric on both sides, one Chinese newspaper
has helpfully suggested skipping the pointless diplomacy and
moving straight to the main course by serving up Japan
withan atom bomb.

　That, thank goodness, is grotesque hyperbole: the government
in Beijing is belatedly trying to play down the dispute,
aware of the economic interests in keeping the peace. Which
all sounds very rational, until you consider history - especially
the parallel between China's rise and that of imperial Germany
over a century ago.

　Back then nobody in Europe had an economic interest in conflict;
but Germany felt that the world was too slow to accommodate its
growing power, and crude, irrational passions like nationalism
took hold.

　China is re-emerging after what it sees as 150 years of
humiliation, surrounded by anxious neighbours, many of them
allied to America. In that context, disputes about clumps of rock
could become as significant as the assassination of an archduke.

One mountain, two tigers

　Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of
political theatre - the product of elections in Japan and
a leadership transition in China.

　The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese
government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner.
The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of
Tokyo's China-bashing governor, （Ｓｈｉｎｔａｒｏｕ　Ｉｓｈｉｈａｒａ）　
who wanted to buy them himself.

　China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim
and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters.
That bolstered the leadership's image, just before Xi Jinping
takes over.

　More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making
money to have time for making war. China is now Japan's
biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo
to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows
on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion.

　Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home:
why would it look for trouble abroad?

　Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and
this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others
have in the past. But each time an island row flares up,
attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan
arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming
a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China
blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

　Growing nationalism in Asia, especially China, aggravates
the threat. Whatever the legality of Japan's claim to the islands,
its roots lie in brutal empire-building. The media of all countries
play on prejudice that has often been inculcated in schools.
Having helped create nationalism and exploited it when it suited
them,

　China's leaders now face vitriolic criticism if they do not
fight their country's corner.

　A recent poll suggested that just over half of China's citizens
thought the next few years would see
　　　　a "military dispute" with Japan.

　The islands matter, therefore, less because of fishing, oil or
gas than as counters in the high-stakes game for Asia's future.
Every incident, however small, risks setting a precedent.
Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines fear that if they make
concessions, China will sense weakness and prepare the next
demand.

　China fears that if it fails to press its case, America and
others will conclude that they are free to scheme against it.

Co-operation and deterrence

　Asia's inability to deal with the islands raises doubts about
how it would cope with a genuine crisis, on the Korean peninsula,
say, or across the Strait of Taiwan.

　China's growing taste for throwing its weight around feeds
deep-seated insecurities about the way it will behave
as a dominant power. And the tendency for the slightest tiff
to escalate into a full-blown row presents problems for America,
which both aims to reassure China that it welcomes its rise,
and also uses the threat of military force to guarantee that
the Pacific is worthy of the name.

　Some of the solutions will take a generation. Asian politicians
have to start defanging the nationalist serpents they have nursed;
honest textbooks would help a lot. For decades to come, China's
rise will be the main focus of American foreign policy.

　Barack Obama's "pivot" towards Asia is a useful start in showing
America's commitment to its allies. But China needs reassuring
that, rather than seeking to contain it as Britain did 19th-century
Germany, America wants a responsible China to realise its potential
as a world power. A crudely political WTO complaint will add
to Chinese worries .

　Given the tensions over the islands (and Asia's irreconcilable
versions of history), three immediate safeguards are needed.

　One is to limit the scope for mishaps to escalate into crises.
A collision at sea would be less awkward if a code of conduct
set out how vessels should behave and what to do after an accident.
Governments would find it easier to work together in emergencies
if they routinely worked together in regional bodies. Yet, Asia's
many talking shops lack clout because no country has been ready
to cede authority to them.

　A second safeguard is to rediscover ways to shelve disputes
over sovereignty, without prejudice. The incoming President
Xi should look at the success of his predecessor, Hu Jintao,
who put the "Taiwan issue" to one side. With the Senkakus
(which Taiwan also claims), both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
were happy to leave sovereignty to a later generation to decide.
That makes even more sense if the islands' resources are worth
something: even state-owned companies would hesitate to put their
oil platforms at risk of a military strike.

　Once sovereignty claims have been shelved, countries can
start to share out the resources - or better still, declare
the islands and their waters a marine nature reserve.

　But not everything can be solved by co-operation, and so
the third safeguard is to bolster deterrence. With the Senkakus,
America has been unambiguous: although it takes no position
on sovereignty, they are administered by Japan and hence fall
under its protection. This has enhanced stability, because
America will use its diplomatic prestige to stop the dispute
escalating and China knows it cannot invade. Mr Obama's
commitment to other Asian islands, however, is unclear.

　The role of China is even more central. Its leaders insist
that its growing power represents no threat to its neighbours.
They also claim to understand history. A century ago in Europe,
years of peace and globalisation tempted leaders into thinking
that they could afford to play with nationalist fires without
the risk of conflagration. After this summer, Mr Xi and his
neighbours need to grasp how much damage the islands are in fact
causing. Asia needs to escape from a descent into corrosive
mistrust. What better way for China to show that it is sincere
about its peaceful rise than to take the lead ?
The End

054
HisHoliness The 14th Dalai Lama's
Acceptance Speech,
on the occasion of the award
of the Nobel Peace Prize
in Oslo, December 10, 1989

　Your Majesty, Members of the Nobel Committee, Brothers and Sisters:

　I am very happy to be here with you today to receive the Nobel Prize
for Peace. I feel honoured, humbled and deeply moved that you should
give this important prize to a simple monk from Tibet. I am no one special.
But, I believe the prize is a recognition of the true values of altruism,
love, compassion and nonviolence which I try to practise, in accordance
with the teachings of the Buddha and the great sages of India and Tibet.

　I accept the prize with profound gratitude on behalf of the oppressed
everywhere and for all those who struggle for freedom and work
for world peace. I accept it as a tribute to the man who founded
the modern tradition of nonviolent action for change - Mahatma Gandhi
- whose life taught and inspired me. And, of course, I accept it
on behalf of the six million Tibetan people, my brave countrymen
and women inside Tibet, who have suffered and continue to suffer
smuch. They confront a calculated and systematic strategy aimed
at the destruction of their national and cultural identities.
The prize reaffirms our conviction that with truth, courage and
determination as our weapons, Tibet will be liberated.

　No matter what part of the world we come from, we are all basically
the same human beings. We all seek happiness and try to avoid suffering.
We have the same basic human needs and concerns. All of us
human beings want freedom and the right to determine our own destiny
as individuals and as peoples. That is human nature. The great changes
that are taking place everywhere in the world, from Eastern Europe to
Africa, are a clear indication of this.

　In China the popular movement for democracy was crushed by brutal
force in June this year. But I do not believe the demonstrations were
in vain, because the spirit of freedom was rekindled among
the Chinese people and China cannot escape the impact of this spirit
of freedom sweeping many parts of the world. The brave students and
their supporters showed the Chinese leadership and the world
the human face of that great nation.

　Last week a number of Tibetans were once again sentenced to prison
terms of up to nineteen years at a mass show trial, possibly intended
to frighten the population before today's event. Their only "crime" was
the expression of the widespread desire of Tibetans for the restoration
of their beloved country's independence.

　The suffering of our people during the past forty years of occupation
is well documented. Ours has been a long struggle. We know our cause
is just. Because violence can only breed more violence and suffering,
our struggle must remain nonviolent and free of hatred. We are trying
to end the suffering of our people, not to inflict suffering upon others.

　It is with this in mind that I proposed negotiations between Tibet and
China on numerous occasions. In 1987, I made specific proposals
in a five-point plan for the restoration of peace and human rights in Tibet.
This included the conversion of the entire Tibetan plateau into a Zone
of Ahimsa, a sanctuary of peace and nonviolence where human beings and
nature can live in peace and harmony.

　Last year, I elaborated on that plan in Strasbourg, at the European
Parliament. I believe the ideas I expressed on those occasions are both
realistic and reasonable, although they have been criticised by some of
my people as being too conciliatory. Unfortunately, China's leaders have
not responded positively to the suggestions we have made, which included
important concessions. If this continues we will be compelled to
reconsider our position.

　Any relationship between Tibet and China will have to be based on
the principle of equality, respect, trust and mutual benefit. It will
also have to be based on the principle which the wise rulers of Tibet
and of China laid down in a treaty as early as 823 A.D., carved on
the pillar which still stands today in front of the Jo-khang, Tibet's
holiest shrine, in Lhasa, that "Tibetans will live happily in the great
land of Tibet, and the Chinese will live happily in the great land of
China".

　As a Buddhist monk, my concern extends to all members of the human
family and, indeed, to all sentient beings who suffer. I believe all
suffering is caused by ignorance. People inflict pain on others
in the selfish pursuit of their happiness or satisfaction. Yet true
happiness comes from a sense of inner peace and contentment, which
in turn must be achieved through the cultivation of altruism, of love
and compassion and elimination of ignorance, selfishness and greed.

　The problems we face today, violent conflicts, destruction of nature,
poverty, hunger, and so on, are human-created problems which can be
resolved through human effort, understanding and the development of
a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood. We need to cultivate a universal
responsibility for one another and the planet we share. Although I have
found my own Buddhist religion helpful in generating love and compassion,
even for those we consider our enemies, I am convinced that everyone
can develop a good heart and a sense of universal responsibility with
or without religion.

　With the ever-growing impact of science on our lives, religion and
spirituality have a greater role to play by reminding us of our humanity.
There is no contradiction between the two. Each gives us valuable
insights into the other. Both science and the teachings of the Buddha
tell us of the fundamental unity of all things. This understanding is
crucial if we are to take positive and decisive action on the pressing
global concern with the environment. I believe all religions pursue
the same goals, that of cultivating human goodness and bringing
happiness to all human beings. Though the means might appear
different the ends are the same.

　As we enter the final decade of this century I am optimistic that
the ancient values that have sustained mankind are today reaffirming
themselves to prepare us for a kinder, happier twenty-first century.

　I pray for all of us, oppressor and friend, that together we succeed
in building a better world through human understanding and love, and
that in doing so we may reduce the pain and suffering of all sentient
beings.

Thank you.

From Nobel Lectures, Peace 1981-1990

055
REPORT on Tibet
by International Commission of Jurists

　The Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet has the pleasure to submit
to the International Commission of Jurists its Report on those
aspects of events in Tibet which the Committee was called upon
by its terms of reference to consider.
　The Committee came to the following conclusions:

Purshottam Trikamdas, Chairman
Arturo A. Alafriz
T.S. Fernando
K. Bentsi-Enchill
Ong Huck Lim
N.C. Chatterjee
R.P. Mookerjee
Rolf Christophersen
M.R. Seni Pramoj

THE STATUS OF TIBET

　The view of the COMMITTEE was that Tibet was at the very least
a de facto independent State when the Agreement of Peaceful Measures
in Tibet was signed in 1951, and the repudiation of this agreement
by the Tibetan Government in 1959 was found to be fully justified.
In examining the evidence, the COMMITTEE took into account events
in Tibet as related in authoritative accounts by officials and
scholars familiar at first hand with the recent history of Tibet and
official documents which have been published. These show that
Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood
as generally accepted under international law. In 1950 there was a people
and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory,
conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority.
From 1913-1950 foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively
by the Government of Tibet and countries with whom Tibet had foreign
relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet
in practice as an independent State.

　Tibet surrendered her independence by signing in 1951 the Agreement
on Peaceful Measures for the Liberation of Tibet. Under that Agreement
the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic gave
a number of undertakings, among them: promises to maintain the existing
political system of Tibet, to maintain the status and functions
of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of religion
and the monasteries and to refrain from compulsion in the matter
of reforms in Tibet. The COMMITTEE found that these and
other undertakings had been violated by the Chinese People's Republic,
and that the Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate
the Agreement as it did on March 11, 1959.

　On the status of Tibet the previous inquiry was limited to considering
whether the question of Tibet was a matter essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the Chinese People's Republic.
The COMMITTEE considered that it should confine itself
to this question and it was therefore not necessary to attempt
a definitive analysis in terms of modern international law of
the exact juridical status of Tibet. The COMMITTEE was not concerned
with the question whether the status of Tibet in 1950 was one of
de facto or de jure independence and was satisfied that Tibet's
status was such as to make the Tibetan question one for the legitimate
concern of the United Nations even on the restrictive interpretation
of matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a State.

GENOCIDE

　According to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Genocide, which was adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in December, 1948, human groups against which
genocide is recognized as a crime in international law are national,
racial, ethnic and religious.

　The COMMITTEE found that acts of genocide had been committed
in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group,
and that such acts are acts of genocide independently of
any conventional obligation.

　The COMMITTEE did not find that there was sufficient proof of
the destruction of Tibetans as a race, nation or ethnic group as such
by methods that can be regarded as genocide in international law.

　The evidence established four principal facts in relation to genocide:

(a) that the Chinese will not permit adherence to and practice of
Buddhism in Tibet;

(b) that they have systematically set out to eradicate this religious
belief in Tibet;

(c) that in pursuit of this design they have killed religious figures
because their religious belief and practice was an encouragement and
example to others; and

(d) that they have forcibly transferred large numbers of Tibetan
children to a Chinese materialist environment in order to prevent
them from having a religious upbringing.

　The COMMITTEE therefore found that genocide had been committed
against this religious group by such methods.

HUMAN RIGHTS

　The COMMITTEE examined evidence in relation to human rights
within the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

　The COMMITTEE in considering the question of human rights took
into account that economic and social rights are as much a part of
human rights as are civil liberties. They found that the Chinese
communist authorities in Tibet had violated human rights of both kinds.

　The COMMITTEE came to the conclusion that the Chinese authorities
in Tibet had violated the following human rights, which the COMMITTEE
considered to be the standards of behavior in the common opinion
of civilized nations:

ARTICLE ３
　The right to life, liberty and security of person was violated by acts
of murder, rape and arbitrary imprisonment.

ARTICLE ５
　Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment were inflicted
on the Tibetans on a large scale.

ARTICLE ９
　Arbitrary arrests and detention were carried out.

ARTICLE １２
　Rights of privacy, of home and family life were persistently violated
by the forcible transfer of members of the family and by indoctrination
turning children against their parents. Children from infancy upwards
were removed contrary to the wishes of the parents.

ARTICLE １３
　Freedom of movement within, to and from Tibet was denied by
large-scale deportations.

ARTICLE １６
　The voluntary nature of marriage was denied by forcing monks and
lamas to marry.

ARTICLE １７
　The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of private property was
violated by the confiscation and compulsory acquisition of private
property　otherwise than on payment of just compensation and
in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the Tibetan People.

ARTICLE １８
　Freedom of thought, conscience and religion were denied by acts
of genocide against Buddhists in Tibet and by other systematic
acts designed to eradicate religious belief in Tibet.

ARTICLE １９
　Freedom of expression and opinion was denied by the destruction
of scriptures, the imprisonment of members of the Mimang group and
the cruel punishments inflicted on critics of the regime.

ARTICLE ２０
　The right of free assembly and association was violated by the
suppression of the Mimang movement and the prohibition of meetings
other than those called by the Chinese.

ARTICLE ２１
　The right to democratic government was denied by the imposition
from outside of rule by and under the Chinese Communist Party.

ARTICLE ２２
　The economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for the dignity
and free development of the personality of man were denied.
The economic resources of Tibet were used to meet the needs of
the Chinese. Social changes were adverse to the interests of
the majority of the Tibetan people. The old culture of Tibet, including
its religion, was attacked in an attempt to eradicate it.

ARTICLE ２４
　The right to reasonable working conditions was violated
by the exaction of labour under harsh and ill-paid conditions.

ARTICLE ２５
　A reasonable standard of living was denied by the use of the Tibetan
economy to meet the needs of the Chinese settling in Tibet.

ARTICLE ２６
　The right to liberal education primarily in accordance with the choice
of parents was denied by compulsory indoctrination, sometimes after
deportation, in communist philosophy.

ARTICLE ２７
　The Tibetans were not allowed to participate in the cultural life of
their own community, a culture which the Chinese have set out
to destroy.

　Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before
the entry of the Chinese were found to be based on distorted and
exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan
"rebels" of rape, plunder and torture were found in cases of plunder
to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of
belief for this and other reasons.
The End

057
Let's Call the Whole Thing off
TAKESHIMA in Japan, DOKDO in Korea
from Newsweek September 10, 2012

　The frenemies are at it again.Despite all their longstading shared
interests,Japan and South Korea just can't find a way past their
long and bitter history.

　At present they're focusing their love-hate conflict on a desolate
little cluster of volcanic outcrops jutting up from the Sea of Japan,
roughly 210 kilometers across the water from either of the two countries'
mainlands.Collectively known in Japan as Takeshima (bamboo island),
in Korea as Dokdo(rock island),and in the West as the Liancourt Rocks
(named after a French whaling vessel that narrowly avoided being wrecked
there in 1849 ),the islets total less than 19 hectares in area.But in the
minds of Japan and Korea,they've grown large enough to encompass
decades of unresolved grievances.

　This is'nt the first time the flyspeck islets have provoked crisis.
Back in April 2006,South Korea's then-president Roh Moohyun threatned
force,sending gunboats to prevent the nearby seabed.

　According to a U.S.State Department cable disclosed by WikiLeaks,
Washigton feared that Seoul might "do something crazy."
Thomas Schieffer,then America's ambassador to Tokyo,told Japan's vice
foreign minister at the time that "the Koreans are behaving
irrationnally" and warned him that "everyone needs to back off."

　The Koreans and Japanese finally did as he urged,and the situation
cooled down.

　This time,however,things have turned so messy that neither side
may be able to back down from its nationalist posturings.

　In early August,South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak crossed
a red line for the Japanese when he became the first leader of his
nation ever to visit the disputed islands.

　Japan's resentment only worsened the next day,when South Korea's
national soccer team defeated the Japanese in the bronze-medal match
at the London Games - and then,ater the final whistle,a South Korean
midfielder stood on the pitch and hoisted a sign declaring
"Dokdo is our territory".

　Four days after Lee's surprise trip to the rocks,
the President delivered an even more stinging slap
to Japan.

　Out of the blue, he announced that
if Emperor Akihito ever expects to visit South Korea,
he should first apologize for Japan's colonial rule
of the peninsula before and during World War II.

　Many Japanese regarded Lee's words as an insult to the emperor,
and Japan's legislators once again asserted their country's claim
to the islets.

　Last week Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda infuriated the South Koreans
on another sore topic, saying there's no evidence that proves Japan's
imperial army forced Korean women to work as sex slaves.

　This week South Korea intends to hold military exercises on the disputed
islets, and Japan is pondering whether to scrap a currency-swap deal
with Seoul.

　The falling-out is cause for concern not only in Seoul and Tokyo
but in Washington as well.

　Both are vital U.S. trading partners and America's most important allies
in Asia, but more than that: cooperation between them is essential
in keeping North Korea in check.

　And yet their quarrel has grown downright juvenile.

　When Noda sent Lee a letter of complaint, the South Korean president
declined to accept it, instead returning it via a Korean diplomat stationed
in Tokyo. The Koreans later mailed Noda's letter to the Japanese Foreign
Ministry.

　"I'm sorry, but they're behaving like kids in a scuffle,"
said a disgusted Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, Japan's senior vice foreign minister.

　In the end, Tokyo accepted the letter's return, rather than
"tarnish the dignity of Japanese diplomacy," as Noda put it - advising
South Korean officials at the same time to cool their jets.

　Japanese officials struggled to make sense of Lee's actions.
The Korean president had always been viewed as a pragmatist,
more interested in building a "future-minded relationship"
with South Korea's third-largest trading partner than
in dwelling on past misdeeds.

　"What happened to the guy ?"
Noda blurted out during a parliamentary session.

　The most popular explanation points to Lee's approval ratings,
which had sunk to a pitiful 17 percent.

　There's a vicious cycle that has prevailed ever since the advent of
democratic rule in the late 1980s.

　Every five years, a new president sweeps into office,
pledging better relations with Japan.

　But by his third or fourth year in office, the administration
gets ensnared in a corruption scandal,
and the president becomes a lame duck.

　(In July, Lee found it necessary to apologize publicly for a scandal
involving his brother.)

　To rescue what's left of his presidency, he resorts to and
-Japan rhetoric, and relations with Tokyo deteriorate -
a trend that has grown stronger, especially in the past decade.

　Lee, who happens to have been born in Osaka, may have felt
a particular need to prove he's not "pro-Japanese"
One of the most poisonous accusations in South Korea's political
vocabulary.

　As a measure of how deep that distrust runs,
Lee's national loyalties recently came into question because
he seemed ready to sign off on a deal to help the two countries
share military intelligence about their common enemy, North Korea.

　And in fact his standing in the opinion polls rose by roughly
10 points after his visit to the rocks.

　At the same time, however, Lee's trip raises questions
about his integrity as a statesman.

　With only six months remaining in. his term,
why would he jeopardize one of his country's
most important bilateral relationships in exchange
for a mere blip in his approval ratings?

　Even members of his conservative Saenuri Party openly questioned
whether his tactics were in South Korea's national interest.

　"The president's office is resorting to populism," said lawmaker
Choi Kyung-hwan, chief of staff to presidential candidate Park Geun-hye.
"And the next president is going to have to pay the price."

　If the current feud is messy, the history of the islets is even messier.
Although both sides claim to have documents dating back centuries
proving that the rocks belong to them, they insist that the other
side's documents actually describe some other islands in the Sea of Japan.

　And the recent record is no less murky. In its 1951 peace treaty
with the Allied Forces, Japan relinquished much of the Korean territory
it had occupied during the war.

　But Tokyo argues that the islets were exempt from the deal:
the Japanese declared them part of Shimane Prefecture in 1905・
five years before they annexed the Korean Peninsula.

　The Koreans see it differently.

　In 1952, then-President Syngman Rhee unilaterally took control
of the islets by declaring a maritime demarcation line,
and two years later, Seoul sent troops to occupy the Liancourt Rocks.

　Tokyo calls that an "illegal occupation."

　Tokyo has proposed for decades that the two countries file the case
for arbitration by the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

　Last week Seoul once again refused.

　The Koreans say there is no territorial dispute
because the islets are theirs, and agreeing to a legal arbitration
would only contradict this logic.

　But according to the Japanese, this only shows that deep down,
Seoul suspects it might lose. "The Koreans are insecure
about their claims under international law," contends
Hideshi Takesada, a Japanese professor of Asian studies
at Yonsei University in Seoul. "That's why they feel the need
to take measures to strengthen their control of the island."

　In politically apathetic Japan, Takeshima is usually a low-profile issue,
not a cause for flag-burnings or boycotts.

　For the Koreans, on the other hand,
Dokdo is a sacred place
that must be protected at all costs, a proud emblem of their independence
from Japan's colonial rule.

　"Besides being a territorial issue, Dokdo is about history," says
former foreign minister Song Min-soon.

　"To the Korean people, Dokdo bears a special, symbolic meaning-
it symbolizes the 36-year occupation by the Japanese.

　Whenever Koreans hear of the Japanese government's claim [over Dokdo],
they see it as [proof of] Japan's unapologetic attitude."

　That's one more reason behind Lee's trip:
he's said it was meant to teach Tokyo a lesson.
As South Koreans see the situation,
Japan hasn't adequately atoned for the acts it committed
in the first half of the 20th century-including, according to Seoul,
the forcible employment of Korean women
in military brothels.

　Lee was under pressure
from the Constitutional Court of Korea,
which found last year that the government isn't doing
enough to make Tokyo compensate the comfort women.

　The South Koreans say the Japanese just don't get it.

　The Japanese respond
that the Koreans are unreasonably linking two entirely separate issues:
rightful ownership of the Liancourt Rocks
and justice for the comfort women.

　As Noda recently expressed it, speaking to the press corps in Tokyo,
"The Takeshima problem is not an issue that should be discussed
in the context of historical interpretation."

　It's not that Japan is oblivious to its dark past, or unrepentant.
Although the country's right-wing politicians may dispute the details
of its imperial past, most Japanese recognize that many terrible acts
were committed in their country's name.

　Nevertheless, even those ordinary people are running out of patience
with Seoul's demands for apologies.

　As they see it, Japanese prime ministers have apologized
over and over. The Japanese government actually set up a special
fund back in 1995 to compensate the comfort women.

　It ended in failure
after right-wing activists in South Korea
persuaded several former comfort women
not to accept the money,
claiming
that it wasn't an "official" compensation or apology from Japan.

　Ordinary Japanese are baffled by the Koreans' attachment to the islets.

　Since 2005, when Seoul began allowing tourists onto the islets,
visits-pilgrimages, some say-have become hugely popular.

　Last year alone, some 180,000 people made the arduous trip.
In 2010, civic groups,
together with the Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations,
declared Oct. 25 to be Dokdo Day,
an annual occasion for teaching the nation's schoolchildren
to love the remote island outpost.

　(Japan's Shimane Prefecture celebrates a Takeshima Day).

　Broadcasters go so far as reporting on the weather there,
and some television stations end their daily broadcasts
with a video clip of Dokdo as the national anthem plays.

　Activists and political organizers have been holding
"Dokdo awareness" events around South Korea.

　At a July gathering in Seoul promoting corporate social responsibility,
small children were encouraged to write "I love Dokdo" on cookies.
And after Lee's August visit, a group of singers, actors, and college
students braved the strong currents and made a 220-kilometer
relay swim to the rocks.

　So far the demonstrations haven't matched the extremes seen
in March 2005, when a pair of protesters each chopped off one
of their fingers outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul,
and another Korean set himself on fire.

　But the sense of outrage has not gone away.

　Last week a protester in Seoul was arrested for throwing two
plastic bottles filled with feces at the embassy.
(He reportedly turned out to be a man who had previously severed
one of his fingers and mailed it to the embassy.)

　In the face of such nationalistic fervor,
the South Korean government can scarcely back down.

　In fact, Lee's visit to the rocks has raised the ante for any future
South Korean presidents who may seek to prove their conservative
credentials.

　Conservative presidential candidate Park, the daughter of assassinated
dictator Park Chung-hee, has already said she will consider visiting
the islets if she's elected in December.

　In the context of South Korean politics, her family background
is a powerful incentive to prove herself 100 percent Korean,
untainted by "pro-Japanese" attitudes: her father was a cadet
at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy during the war,
and two decades later, as South Korea's president,
he's the one who normalized relations with Japan.

　His daughter can scarcely afford to give ground on the islets,
even if she thinks it's the sensible thing to do.

　There seems to be no way out, at least for the foreseeable future.
Tokyo and Seoul could conceivably decide to shelve the issue
and muddle through, as they did after they normalized relations
some 50 years ago.

　It wouldn't really solve the problem,
but at least it seems doable.

　Alternatively, an exasperated Park Chung-hee is said
to have suggested a more drastic approach
at the time of the normalization talks:
just blast the islets into oblivion.

　Neither government is likely to buy that idea.

　But if those rocks are going to keep causing so much trouble
between the two Asian frenemies,
it might be the only real solution.

058


Overview of the Issue of
the Northern Territories

1. Basic Understanding of the Northern Territories Issue
(1)
The Northern Territories consist of four islands located off
the northeast coast of the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido.
They are: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu.
The Northern Territories are not included in the Kurile Islands.

(2)
Japan discovered and surveyed the Four Northern Islands
before the Russians arrived there. By the early 19th century
at the latest, Japan had effectively established control
over the four islands. In 1855, the Treaty of Commerce,
Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia,
which was concluded in a completely friendly and peaceful manner,
confirmed the already established natural boundaries,
drawing the boundary between the islands of Etorofu
(the northernmost island of the Northern Territories) and Uruppu.
The Four Northern Islands had never been held by foreign countries.

(3)
However, nearing the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union,
in violation of the Neutrality Pact that was still in force
between Japan and the Soviet Union, opened the war with Japan.
Even after Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet forces
continued its offensive against Japan and occupied all of
the Four Northern Islands from 28 August 1945 to 5 September 1945.

(4)
Subsequently, the Soviet Union unilaterally incorporated
the territories under occupation into its own territories
without any legal grounds, and by 1949 had forcibly deported
all Japanese residents of the Four Northern Islands
(approximately 17,000 people).

(5)
Since that time, return of the Northern Territories has been
the ardent wish of the people of Japan, and a deep-rooted movement
among the general public for the return of the islands has developed
national-wide. With this strong support from the people of Japan,
the Government of Japan, under a consistent policy, has persistently
called on the Soviet Union, and subsequently the Russian Federation,
to conclude a peace treaty between the two countries, contingent
on the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.

(6)
As a result of negotiations to date, both Japan and Russia have agreed
to resolve the issue of the attribution of the Four Northern Islands
and to conclude a peace treaty, and have continued vigorous negotiations.
The Russian side also states that it continues to pursue a solution
on the demarcation of an internationally recognized national border
that is acceptable to both countries.

2. Japan's Basic Position
(1)
The Northern Territories are inherent territories of Japan
that continues to be illegally occupied by Russia.
The Government of the United States of America has also consistently
supported Japan's position.

(2)
In order to solve this issue and to conclude a peace treaty
as soon as possible, Japan has energetically continued negotiations
with Russia on the basis of the agreements and documents created
by the two sides so far, such as the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration
of 1956, the Tokyo Declaration of 1993, the Irkutsk Statement
of 2001 and the Japan-Russia Action Plan of 2003.

(3)
Japan's position is that if the attribution of the Northern Territories
to Japan is confirmed, Japan is prepared to respond flexibly to the timing
and manner of their actual return. In addition, since Japanese citizens
who once lived in the Northern Territories were forcibly displaced
by Joseph Stalin, Japan is ready to forge a settlement with the Russian
government so that the Russian citizens living there will not experience
the same tragedy. In other words, after the return of the islands to Japan,
Japan intends to respect the rights, interests and wishes of the Russian
current residents on the islands.

(4)
The Japanese government has requested Japanese people not to enter
the Northern Territories without using the non-visa visit frameworks
until the territorial issue is resolved. Similarly, Japan cannot allow
any activities, including economic activities by a third party,
which could be regarded as submitting to Russian “jurisdiction,”
nor allow any activities carried out under the presumption
that Russia has “jurisdiction” in the Northern Territories.
Japan is of the policy to take appropriate steps to ensure that
this does not happen.
The End

059
Japan's claims for Russian islands
evolve into blind rage
by Sergei Balmasov

　On February 7, Japan celebrated the Day of Northern
Territories with a great splendor.

　The tone was set by Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
At the national rally held under the slogan
"For the return of the northern territories," he described
the recent visit of Dmitry Medvedev to the Southern Kuriles
as "inexcusable rudeness."

　Japanese rightist arranged a rally near the Russian Embassy in Tokyo
where they demanded the return of the South Kuriles and
abused the Russian flag.

　As we know, Tokyo claims the Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan and Habomai islands. It is no accident that
the Day of Northern Territories is celebrated on February 7.
It was February 7, 1855 when Japan and Russia signed
a bilateral Trade and Boundaries Treaty whereby the border
between the islands runs
between Urup and Iturup.

　As a result, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai just
south of Iturup
were given to Japan.
In the unsuccessful Crimean War against Russia when
Britain, France, Turkey and the Kingdom of Sardinia fought
Russia with a united front, the Tsar did not want to fight
with the Japanese.

　In turn, Russia's position is based on the fact that it owns
the Southern Kuriles legally
as a successor to the Soviet Union that had acquired
the territory after the defeat of Hitler'sJapanese allies in 1945.

　Until now, the parties have not signed an amicable treaty.
Tokyo sees a clear connection with the return of
the four South Kuril Islands.

　Japanese media reported that Kan's statements regarding
the Kuril Islands were extremely tough.　We can assume that
this is partly due to the increased attention of high ranking
Russian officials to this region.

　Yet, more serious steps are not expected.
Despite the rigidity of the Kan's statements, they are no more
than words. Under the conditions of the fierce political struggle
in Japan, he simply has to make these statements; otherwise
he would be accused of not defending Japanese interests properly.

　As for the Japanese, currently a real aggravation of the relations
with Russia would not be beneficial for them.

　They understand the benefits of the economic cooperation
between the two countries.
It is no accident that Kan, while demanding that Russia
returns the islands,
immediately rushed to adjust the impression of his speech,
saying that Japan intends to conduct negotiations with Russia
on economic cooperation.

　In the meantime, the Japanese side intends to focus
on a diplomatic solution. On February 10,
Foreign Minister of Japan Seiji Maehara will be coming
to Moscow for talks.
He promised to devote his political career
to the soonest return of ancestral territories.

　Why do Japanese so stubbornly cling to a few islands,
threatening Japanese-Russian relations in general by the territorial claims?

　What are Tokyo's hopes?
Does it expect Russia to succumb to the political pressure
and create a dangerous precedent of major territorial concessions?

　The bets in the "Kurile game" imposed on Russia
by Japan are very high.

First,
the establishment of the Japanese control over the Southern
Kuriles gives Tokyo some serious natural gas reserves,
and will significantly increase the production of fish, crab, etc.

Secondly,
he transfer of the Southern Kuril Islands to Japan s
ignificantly limits the ability to maneuver the Russian Pacific fleet,
and thus will cause significant damage to the Russian defense.

In addition,
the transfer of the Southern Kuriles would be the starting point
for future territorial claims on other Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

　The notion of the "northern territories" in Japan is very vague.
There are quite strong movements in the country
advocating the return of all the territories lost in 1945
to the land of the rising sun.

In addition,
in the event that the Southern Kuriles are given to Japan,
others wishing to expand their borders at the expense of Russia
will be noticeably more active.

　It is one thing if Russia voluntarily conducts demarcation
of the borders, and a completely different one
if it looks like surrendering to someone's arm-twisting.

　Estonia is another country that has explicit territorial claims
against Russia. In addition, Finland and Latvia have rather powerful
nationalist movements that also require Russia to make some
territorial concessions.

　Earlier, under Yushchenko's government,
Ukraine also dreamt of adding some territories at the expense
of Russia.

　Chinese also have not forgotten about the lands in the Far East
"unfairly" detached in the Tsarist times.

　Given that Moscow understands the strategic importance
of the Kuril Islands for Russia,
it can be assumed
that such ideas of the main Japanese diplomat will remain
the naive dreams.

　Therefore, under these circumstances
the Japanese dream to push the right decision looks
very insubstantial.

　In particular, this is obvious from the reaction of the Russian
Foreign Ministry that has repeatedly answered the claims
of Tokyo saying that visits of the highest representatives
of the Russian authorities to the Southern Kuriles are strictly
an internal affair of Russia.

　Interestingly enough, in many ways
the Japanese overreaction was due to the fact
that Moscow only recently started thinking of its Far Eastern
suburbs.

　In the 1990's, when Moscow had forgotten about the distant
islands that were living their own unenviable lives,
Tokyo intensely courted the residents of the Kuril,
hoping that the archipelago, neglected by the center,
will fall into the Japanese hands like an over-ripe apple.

　Now the situation has moved forward.
Although the problems of the Kuril Islands,
including their Southern part,
remain largely unchanged,
there are some positive developments.

　For example,
the Russian authorities intend to improve transport connection
of the islands with the mainland through the construction of
new airports and docs, as well as to strengthen the island's
defense.

　Russia is currently heavily investing in the Kuril Islands,
including the Southern part.

　All this suggests
that Russia does not intend to give up its territories
　　　to anyone interested.

　This is what causes the impotent fury of the Japanese politicians.
The End

060
Special Report
Japanese Prisoner of War
Life and Death
in Soviet P.W.Camps
by SCAP/GHQ Military Intelligence Section,Feb.1,1950

�U．The Death-Factor in Soviet Prisoner of War Camps

　Surrender of the Japanese Army in 1945 placed
under Soviet responsibility 2,723,492 Japanese
(civilian and military)
according to the Japanese General Staff.

　Approximately 700,000 of these were transported
from Manchuria and Korea
into Soviet territory for internment.

　As of May 1949, the repatriation account showed
469,041 military and civilian personnel
still to be repatriated and chargeable to
Soviet prisoner of war authorities.

　The Soviet authorities consequently will be accountable
for 374,041 persons after deducting this season's
announced repatriation of 95,000.

　The Japanese Government estimates
153,509 possibly alive,
based on the receipt of post cards by relatives
in 1947 and 1948; this is by no means conclusive,
but exceeds, under any criterion,
the official Soviet figure of 95,000 to be repatriated
as of 1 May 1949;

　For many years prior to the surrender,
the Japanese Government had kept a detailed record
of the movements of military and civilian contingents.

　Their official records were initially checked by G-2,
in clarge of
the Agenda for the Surrender Delegation in Manila,
in 1945,
and have been under periodic scrutiny since,
in the G-3 surveillance of the repatriation programs
and related naval transport.

　The statistics have been checked
through every possible means,
including nation-wide surveys of the families
of missing personnel,
conferences with survivors of
Japanese military units disarmed by the Soviets
and the countless interrogations
of thousands of returnees from various Russian PW camps.

　Repatriates report that intolerable conditions found
upon arrival at prisoner of war camps in 1945
resulted in thousands of fetalities.

　A tabulated list of 125 prisoners of war camps
in the Soviet Area,
giving the number of prisoners and number of dead,
was compiled by
the Japanese Demobilization Bureau
in January 1947,
based on numerous interrogation reports,
oral and written statements
by repatriates.

　Of 209,300 prisoners of war in these camps,
51,332 died from malnutrition and communicable diseases.

　The mortality rate obtained was thus 24.5 percent.
This cumulative percentage deals with the first years
after the war, when prisoners treatment
and general camp conditions were admittedly at their worst.

　In spite of improvements after 1947,
the cumulative death rate for the four year period
would still represent an appalling
and reckless waste of Japanese lives.

　In addition to statistics
arrived at through analytical research
and compilation,
thousands of repetriates have made sworn statements
which substantiatean
excessive mortality rate
of prisoners of war,
in certain periods,
through malnutrition, overwork, cold and disease.

　Said one returnee: "After the surrender,
we were disarmed at Haingan, Manchuria,
and taken to the coal mining town of Morodoi, Mongolia.

　Later an epidemic broke out among us
and all the prisoners in the camp contracted it.

　Only 225 prisoners out of more than 600 survived.

　This constitutes a catastrophel death rate
of approximately 60 percent in this particular area.

　Another one stated:
"Our battalion of 350 men was detained
in the 3rd PW Camp in Khabarovsk.
About 200 men died from illness and malnutrition,"

　This, again, is a death rate of almost 60 percent.

　A 1948 repatriate explained
to the widow of one of his PW comrades:
"In October 1945 we were sent to a camp west of Chite,
where we felled trees.

　Owing to meager fcod rations and severe cold,
many prisoners fell ill,
and toward the end of March 1946,
50 percent of the prisoners in the camp died.

　At that time your husband fell ill
with eruptive typhus.
Owing to the shortage of medicines, he died."

　Another 1948 returnee said:
"Our group of about 1,000 was taken prisoner
in Menchuria when the war ended.

　We were taken as far as the Ural Mountains
in European Russia, and interned in a camp.

　About 70 percent were repatriated safely,
but the rest died either from malnutrition
or accidents while working.

　Repatriates have expresscd extreme bitterness
concerning the camps in the Amur area,
reporting 3,000 deaths in a total of 11,000 internees
in some 20 camps,
a death rate of approximately 27 percent.

　One returnee from this area reported:
"The number of dead buried
in the Kuibyshevka Special Hospital, Area No. 888,
from a count of graves, totaled 1,500.

　At the hospital in Blagoveshohenak,
500 prisoners of war died of smallpox and other diseaaes;
in the Mukhino and Tu Camps, there were 600 dead;
in other camps 400 were reported;
these figures aggregate 3,000."

　A repatriate employed as a grave digger
at one of the district PW hospitals reported that
"So many died from starvation and disease that
a crew of 50 men could not keep up
with the job of burying the dead.

　According to a medical officer,
the deaths between 1945 and 1946
ran as high as 30 percent of the prisoners in that area."

　A death rate of 30 percent,
even allowing for cumulative errors,
assumes more serious proportions
compared to the Japanese domestic death rate
at the height of the American air blitz of only 2.9 per hundred.

　If we strike an average of the statistical death rates
applied to the three winters from 1945 to 1947 inclusive,
under variable camp conditions,
we arrive at a certain annual cumulative rate of 7%.

　With a weeding out of the physically unfit through death,
the sturdy survivors, with greater resistance,
show a decreasing mortality rate, combined with
a factual improvement in living conditions in 1948 and 1949
for calculated political effect,
in order to support the systematic Communist indoctrination
of the remaining prisoners.

　Discounting that the initial high percentages,
reported in certain localities in 1947,
apply uniformly to all camps,
the general application of these macabre percentages,
in a descending scale after the murderous winter of 1945,
will account for the discrepancy
between Soviet figure of 95,000
and Japanese totals of 374,041 prisoners of war
unaccounted for at the end of the repatriation season of 1949:

　Soviet camp authorities have repeatedly refused
to answer queries into the fate of these unknown thousands.

　When confronted recently with an eccounting
for the 374,000 misaing,
a Soviet spokeaman coldly brushed aside all implications
and voiced indifference to "the book-keeping methods"
of the Japanese Government or SCAP.

　This is poor comfort for the thousands
of bereaved Japanese families
that have awaited thc return of a father or son.

　The world will hold
the Soviet camp authorities responsible
for tolerating conditions and treatments
that have resulted in the probable death
of several hundred thousand Japanese prisoners of war,
in military and civil categories.

�V．Malnutrition and Lack of Medical Care
　　　in Soviet PW Camps

　Repatriates are unanimous in asserting that especially
during the first year of their captivity in Siberia
food supplies were far below the minimum needed
to offset cold and fatigue.

　Internees were forced to rely on whatever they could scavenge
from the countryside to supplement their deficient diet,
eating bark rrun trees, frogs, snails
and anything else they could find.

　Accentuated by a total lack of sanitary facilities,
disease spread through bodies already weakened by fatigue,
exposure and malnutrition.

　The death rate was high in all of the prisoner groups
even before they arrived at the make-shift internment camps.

　Camps reflected almost total unpreparedness
by Soviet authorities
to care for large numbers of prisoners.

　Prisoners were generally housed
in whatever facilities were available,
usually in labor camps that lacked any serious provision
for sanitation or welfare.

　Many camps were far from human habitation
and almost all were considered totally unfit as living quarters
because of poor construction and overcrowding.

　Repatriates allege that it was not unusual for prisoners
to be herded into buildings so tightly that they could not lie dawn.

　Statements bearing out these facts have bean furnished
by thousands of Japanese repatriates. One reported that
"in the camp some prisoners killed themselves, others escaped.
For fully three months we were given only potatoes,
so we ate all the frogs, snails and slugs around the camp."

　Typical coazuents follows "A number of us fell ill
because of insufficient clothing
in addition to the poor food supply;
four prisoners scuetimes shared one ration;
often no food was received for an entfre day.
Quarters were crowded, facilities inadequate."

　Approximately 26,000 Japanese civilians were assembled
in an area around Hamhung (Korea) in May 1946.

　"Seven thousand died from exposure and starvation;"
and "we left Suifenho on 13 September 1945,
crossed the Amur River
and marched for about a month across the Siberian wilderness,
suffering from hunger, chill and fatigue.
Our destination was a camp in a mountain mining area
where neither house nor life could be seen."

　All prisoners agreed that
conditions were so bad that only the strong could survive.
Sanitary conditions were so inadequate
that typhus, eruptive fever, pneumonia
and other diseases were rampant.

　To a large extent
this was due to a lack of resistance
resulting from malnutrition, fatigue and exposure.

　Returnees assert that the lack of facilities in the camps
to prevent the spread of disease
and the general apathy of Soviet authorities
toward the illnesses of the prisoners
often permitted the epidemics to become critical
before anything was done.

　Thus many deaths, estimated at 10 percent
in even the best camps, were caused by disease.

　The prisoners, in weakened condition, were easy victims,
even succumbing to diseases that are not usually fatal.

　The ratio of deaths to number of prisoners was still higher
in camps in obscure localities.

　Medical care was scanty and existing dispensaries
and hospitals were understaffed
and lacking in equipment and medicines.

　Indeed, had it not been for medical supplies and stores
from the Japanese Army in Manchuria and Korea
and the availability of trained Japanese medical personnel,
repatriates believe that
medical assistance would have been entirely lacking.

　In their attempt to get all the labor possible from prisoners,
Soviet authorities reportedly forced injured and sick prisoners
to work and these individuals were often subjected to beating
and other disciplinary action
if they were unable to complete their work satisfactorily.

　Only prisoners with fever temperatures of over 100°Fahrenheit
and those with visible external injuries
were relieved from work.

　Thus hernia, appendicitis, zieumonia, tuberculosis
and other illnesses often killed the prisoners
because of lack of treatment.

　Individuals seeking medical attention were usually
suspected by authorities of "malingering"
and so prisoners did not seek attention
for fear of disciplinary action in the event
that nothing serious could be found.

　With the start of repatriation the policy was
to repatriate only internees too ill or weak to work.

　However, most of these individuals were interned
in hospitals for a time to recuperate before actual repatriation.

　If their health improved markedly
they could always be returned to PW camps.

　Those who did not show improvement,
however, were repatriated.
Some were so ill before entering hospitals that they died there.
Some 10/20 percent of the prisoners transferred
to hospitals in North Korea, from the USSR,
are reported to have died.

　Innumerable other reports from returnees
round out a picture of abject misery
in which Japanese intcrnees found themselves obliged to exist.

　Everywhere they were forced to perform heavy manual labor
while the food issued was both meager
and lacking in nourishment.

　Almost everywhere housing was poor
and deficient in proper sanitary facilities.

　The inevitable result of the conditions of starvation,
over-crowding and filth was that the sickness rate soared
and finally assumed epidemic proportions.

　It was obvious to internees that
the Soviets had no serious plans to care for the sick.

　In this period the Soviets could not control
even comparatively minor illnesses and many died who,
with a modicum of care, would have recovered.

　But real tragedy befell when malignant,
filth-bred epidemics appeared.

　Top killer was eruptive typhus.

　Victims first developed a fever
accompanied by a mulberry-colored rash.
Next they would thrash in delfrinm,
become covered with ulcerations
and suffer severe attacks of diarrhea,
after which they would fall,
into a deep final stupor preliminary to death.

　During all these stages
the possibility of contagion was great,
and the disease swept through the crowded,
filthy encampuents.

　In the Chien-Tao and Yen Chi internment camps alone,
repatriates report that more than 10,000 succumbed
to the disease.

　Those who lived through the typhus epidemic
faced lung diseases brought on by extreme exhaustion,
scurvy resulting from diet deficiencies,
and the occasional amputation of gangrenous toes,
fingers, arms or legs
which had been frozen in the bitter cold.

　Regardless of the suffering that prisoners endured,
camp authorities forced them to produce a set amount of work.

　Someone who made the trip to Siberia
in the "comparative comfort" or an open freight car
loaded with 100 of his fellow prisoners,said:
" We worked during the day only at first,
later we had to work even at night.

　In the meantime rations had become very bad
and we worked on empty stomachs.

　The temperature was sometimes 40 or 50 degrees
below zero.

　Due to hunger and hard work, we gradually became weak
and many comrades were taken ill and died.

　We ate weeds and anything we could get...."

　Cumulative evidence of the incredible heartlessness
of the Soviet camp authorities toward the Japaneso
interned in Siberian prison camps
came in with every shipload of men returning from captivity.

　One repatriate, a surgeon, reported that
under Soviet Army orders he established
a 1,000 patient hospital in North Korea.

He added that in June and July 1946,
the Soviets sent 30,000 serious cases and cripples
who were unable to work to North Korea
where, hampered by overcrowding and
lack of medical supplies,
both the patients and the hospital staff
went through "indescribable hardships".

　The Soviet troops, the surgeon went on,
"searched the prisoners for any documents,
ashes, hair and like items in order to conceal
their atrocities and seized all evidence
by making surprise inspections".

　The doctor concluded his report with the statement
that he and members of his staff managed
to evade Soviet searchers by concealing
certain documents and records in secret places.

　Another repatriate, a former Japanese Army captain,
after verifying the surgeon's story,
made the following statements
"Due to unsatisfactory conditions
an unknown fever broke out
and our comrades were infected daily.

　There was only one non-commissioned sanitary officer
and he had no sanitary equipment and very few medicines.

　Despite our earnest entreaty,
the Soviet authorities still enforced the allotted work,
while the fever spread throughout the whole company.

　Together with the fever,
all members of the company suffered malnutrition.

　By this time, we were allowed to enter the hospital,
but despite the efforts of a Japanese nurse
many of our comrades died.

　I carried the ashes of 25 dead with me,
but to my regret, I was obliged to bury all of them
due to the stubborn rejection of the Soviet authorities.

　Moreover, a name list which I valued very much
was also confiscated by the Soviet authorities.
The total dead in my company was 80."

　Another repatriate reported that
Cherenhov was one of the major coal mines in Siberia
and more than 3,000 Japanese PWs
were forced to work in the coal mines.

　"We were sent via the Siberian Railway
from Mukden, Manchuria to Cherenhov,
which is west of Irkutsk on Lake Baikal."

　We suffered greatly from the acute cold climate,
poor and insufficient food and bad sanitation."

　The unfavorable conditions under which
prisoners of war were employed
took their inevitable toll,
"with compulsory hard labor under such bad conditions
about 1,000 died of malnutrition or eruptive typhus
during a period from December 1945 to Febrw'ry 1946."

　The horrors faced by the Japanese coal mining crews
who saw one-third of their fellow prisoners die
of starvation and disease
in a period of three months
can be gained from the story of a repatriate
who was employed as a grave-digger at a PW hospital:

　"They came here becauso of malnutrition.
In the winter of 1945,
many of the patients had loose bowels
and about 90 percent of the men
who contracted this sickness died.

　Fifty men were on duty digging graves every night.

　At first individual graves were dug
but as the death rate grew
we dug graves for two, five and 25 bodies,
but even at that
we were unable to bury them all
and they were stacked up.

　Most of the soldiers that died were young;
some of them also died from the cold....

　According to the medical officer,
the deaths between 1945 and 1946
ran as high as 30 percent of the prisoners
in that area."

　Bearing out the statements made
by the Lake Baikal coal miner,
Kazuho Furuya wrote a letter to the "Asahi" in Tokyo:

　"During our internuent in the Chinagolskaya Camp, Soviet Union,
the starvation, coldness and excessive heavy work forced on us
resulted in many victims.

　Soviet soldiers would carry away the naked bodies
of the dead PWs piled up on a sled."

　The Maritime Provinces also provided the customary hardship
and death for the imprisoned Japanese.

　On 20 October 1945, one hundred PWs
were assigned to a camp in Manzovka
where they were employed as farmers.

　Eruptive typhus broke out and became so deadly
that only 60 were returned.

　At a sawmill nearby 120 out of 200 died of the fever.

　A former inmate of a PWs camp in Ulan Bator,
Outer Mongolia, had this to say about his imprisonment
and his jailers:

　"The fact that 15,000 Japanese prisoners of war
in Ulan Bator
fought and persecuted one another in order to live
is an unprecedented tragedy caused by the defeat.

　We here forced to engage in various kinds of work
such as lumbering, quarrying, construction and coal mining.

　Since 15,000 of us were detained in a town
with a population of 50,000
starvntion was a matter of course.

　To make matters worse
we were forced to fulfill the "norn"
fixed under the Five Year Reconstruction Plan (of the Soviets)
and all our human rights were utterly ignored.
Ulan Bator was a town of thieves and prevaricators."

　A returnee from Londoko, northwest of Khabarovsk,
reported that prisoners in his camp existed
on Kaoliang, soy-beans, salt and oil,
and that a death rate from malnutrition and pneumonia soared,
making the period from October 1945 to January 1946
"really a livig hell on earth".

　A returnee from Antonovka and Santogo,
both in Siberia, remarked,
"Compared with the life of a PW ,
my present life in Japan is so easy
that I feel as if it is a dream.

　The mere thought of the life I led as a prisoner
makes my blood run cold.

　I wish to let my countrymen have a sight
of the prisoner's hardships and worry of those days."

　"I was fortunate to get out of the region
400 miles west of Lake Baikal
where many of my comrades died one after another
due to a starvation diet, severe cold and heavy work",
admitted another returnee.

　A Japanese who spent his period of imprisonment
felling trees near a small mountain village
180 miles north of Chitc, Siberia1,
bitterly recalled:
"Many Japanese died of tuberculosis and malnutrition
due to hard work and the food shortage.

　Having been prepared for the worst,
that we would be forced to work to our dying day,
we often thought that
we would rather die than suffer from heavy labor any more.

　Really we were envious of the dead at that time."

　Repatriate interrogations are full of remarks such as:
"Whenever I recall to memory
the life I had in Siberia
a shudder runs through my frame" or
"As the food situation was bad, we suffered acutely from hunger."

　But this comment from a repatriate
formerly imprisoned near Vladivostok
is an important clue to one of the real problems facing PWs:

　"In this camp there were many democrats and communists,
however, most of them were false progressives.

　The living conditions were not so good,
but we were especially annoyed
by the. Japanese who acted as informers."

　To the miseries of starvation, bitter cold
and hard labor burdening the PWs,
the Soviets added their indoctrination plan
which was furthered
by self-seeking stooges
recruited from among the PW ranks.

　One disgusted returnee reported that,
"at the time of my repatriation
the 'Democratic League' was organized
and the greater part of its members
consisted of former military personnel
and civilian workers.

　The league was conducting
a communist training course
and had great power
in deciding who was to be repatriated."

　One of the leaders of the Youth Communist Party
formed by the PWs said:
"I was one of the leaders
of the Youth Communist Party
during my detention in the Soviet Union.

　Prior to cur embarkation for Japan at Nakhodka
I, like other conrades, hailed
" Long live Generalissimo Stalin !"
and pledged before the Democratic Group
to join the Japan Communist Party
as soon as we landed in the country of the reactionaries.

　After I returned home I learned
that the Occupation Forces,
which we were told to be our greatest enemy
were exerting the utmost effort
to accelerate our repatriation
and the people at home,
whom we believed to be indifferent towards our return,
were making a strong campaign to expedite our repatriation.

　I was surprised at the real situation of the country
and became aware
that the ideas
with which we were indoctrinated were false."

IV．Soviet Exploitation
of Japanese Prisoner of War Labor

　The Soviet policy to exploit prisoners of war to the fullest
before repatriating them resulted in a heavy toll of lives.

　The Soviet Union's primary interest
with respect to Japanese PWs
was the complete utilization of manpower and technicians
in various fields of industry
to increase their postwar economic-military potentials.

　More labor, more production,
were the Soviets' unceasing demands
to attain their avowed goal of overtaking
and surpassing the capitalistic world
in agricultural and industrial production
by a series of Five Year Plans.

　To this end, Japanese internees
were compelled to engage in extremely arduous labor
with pitifully inadequate food, clothing and shelter.

　On arrival at Soviet PW camps,
internees were immediately forced to work
on the projects
for which that particular camp was responsible.

　Exceedingly perfunctory medical inspections wore given
by Soviet medical personnel
to determine the work capacity of individual prisoners.

　Physical classifications varied at different camps.

　The main distinction was
between those capable of performing heavy labor
and those fit only for light duties.

　In many instances,
no attempt was made to follow these classifications,
and prisoners were forced to perform heavy labor
regardless of condition.

　Physical examinations consisted
of the PWs stripping to their waists
and the doctors cursorily glancing at their general physical structure.

　Very little attempt was made
to diagnose for internal disorder or other chronic ailments.

　If a person appeared to be healthy,
he was automatically classified
as fit for heavy labor.

　Only PWs with fever of over 100°were considered ill.

　In case of injury, when external change was not apparent,
the injured were not hospitalized
but were put to work.

　External injury without accompanying increase in temperature
was often not considered as an excuse from labor.

　Work projects for manual laborers, according to ropatriates,
included lumbering, loading and unloading railcars, mining,
road or railroad repair and construction, excavation, stovedoring
and other labor requiring heavy physical exertion.

　Japanese Pws, noted for their industry,
were driven to the point of emaciation
and complte fatigue.

　All projects were placed
under the "norm" basis of production quotas,
which were usually much higher
than those assigned to Russian labor groups.

　These "norms" were reportedly based
on the number of individuals in each labor group
regardless of physical condition.

　Thus strong prisoners usually had to do much more
than their individual quotas in order to make up
for the weaker prisoners.

　If the daily production of a group was
below the demands of the Soviet authorities,
the prisoners were often forced to work continuously
as long as 18 hours or more.

　Regardless of weather or individual physical condition,
the prisoner' a minimum working day was eight hours.

　Very rarely were the prisoners able to complete
their "norm" in such a short time.

　Repatriatos report that food supplies wore so inadequate
that, combined with enforced labor and long hours,
all of the prisoners suffered from malnutrition.

　Tho amount of food allotted to tho prisoners
was contingent upon the percentage of the "norm" accomplished,
and thus already enervated prisoners
who could not complete their "norm"
were further weakened
when food was denied thern.

　Only in the most extreme cases of malnutrition
were prisoners relieved from work,
and it is reported that many of these subsequently died.

　Othor deaths were reportedly caused by
exposure or fatigue
during working hours as a result of inadequate clothing;
and lack of rest.

　Although all were in weakened condition
which became progressively worse,
the work "norms" wore not lesse

　With the beginning of 1948,
many ropatriates have reported,
the Soviets began to treat Japanese PWs more kindly.

　Although Soviet labor commanders were reportedly prohibited
from boating prisoners of war
to gain more production,
other means just as effective wero used to increase the PWs output.

　Production races were held between camps,
with the "winning" camp receiving flattering panegyrics,
and the losing camps being looked upon with cold contempt.

　Campaigns for 120 percent production or l50 percent productions, etc,
were held, with outstanding work being rewarded
by presentation of medals and banners,
and perhaps rocognition being given
in the propaganda newspaper "Nippon Shimbun".

　Leaders of campaigns reached a point of frenzied enthusiasm,
with the result that PWs were often forced to work
for 12 or 13 hours a day to complete the daily work quota.

　At the same time, the rumor became prevalent
that repatriation depended somewhat upon the labor records
attained by individuals and camps.

　With the rising stabilization of Soviet economy in early 1948,
the pay system was added as a further incentive for labor.

　PWs completing more than 100 percent of their daily quota
were awarded food or money.

　Most of this money was reported to have been "subtracted"
as "expenses" by the Soviet authorities.

　Through this subterfuge the Soviets now claim that
PWs were not engaged in enforced labor,
but rather were paid for their work.

　The Russians' insatiable demand for labor production
was abetted by highly indoctrinated Japanese fanatics
who were without regard for their hapless comrades.

　According to repatriate, a Soviet physician found
that an internee he was treating for a leg injury
in the Rybstroy PW Camp in April 1949,
was not feverish and placed him on full duty status.

　The pain-wracked PW lagged in his work
and his Japanese foreman denounced him.

　He was prosecuted for his "undemocratic" attitude
by the People's Court and was told
that his case would receive further consideration at another court.
That night, scorned by his comrades
and fearful of the future,
the injured PW hanged himself with his leggings.

　This man and countless other thousands
paid the cost of completing the current Soviet Five Year Plan
in four years.
The End

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